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THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS:
REASSESSMENT OF AN EVOLVING LEGAL AND
SCIENTIFIC INTERFACE
*MICHAELJ. WILLIAMS
The mentally retarded person's' right to treatment first
received professional recognition in 1960,2 and legal recognition in
*A. A., 1974, North Dakota State School of Science; B.S., 1976, University of North Dakota; J.
D., 1979, University of North Dakota. Mr. Williams has served as counsel for the Association of
Retarded Citizens in numerous claims involving the rights of mentally retarded persons. The author
would like to acknowledge Ms. Theresa Henneman for her assistance in preparing this Article.
1. Mental retardation is defined as significant "subaverage general intellectual functioning
resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN
MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (1983) [hereinafter CLASSIFICATION]. Mental retardation is not
synonymous with developmental disability. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-01.2-01(1) (Supp. 1985).
Section 25-01.2- 01 of the North Dakota Century Code defines developmental disability as follows:
1. "Developmental disability" means a severe, chronic disability of a person which:
a. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental
and physical impairments;
b. Is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two;
c. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
d. Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following
areas of major life activity:
(1) Self-care;
(2) Receptive and expressive language;
(3) Learning;
(4) Mobility;
(5) Self-direction;
(6) Capacity for independent living; and
(7) Economic sufficiency; and
e. Reflects the person's needs for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
Id. Because of the stigma associated with the label "mentally retarded," this Article will use the term
"developmentally disabled" unless the context requires otherwise. For the definition of
developmentally disabled used by the court in Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, which is
virtually identical to the language of 5 25-01.2-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, see infra note
190.
2. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960) (advocating the need for proper
treatment for mentally disabled individuals).
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1966. 3 The right to treatment, however, received little recognition
in North Dakota prior to 1982. 4 North Dakota's failure to
adequately meet the rights of persons with mental retardation was
documented as early as 1970. 5  However, neither mental
retardation professionals nor mental disability lawyers in North
Dakota were able to effect the massive systemic changes necessary
to meet the rights and needs of persons with mental retardation
prior to the landmark class action lawsuit of Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Olson.6 This Article analyzes the scientific and legal
interface of the rights and needs of the developmentally disabled in
the context of Olson.
I. INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL RETARDATION:
HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES
Although isolated, and sometimes derogatory, references to
mental retardation were noted in early literature, scientists made
no concerted effort to study or treat the conditions of mental
retardation before the early 1800s. 7 The first significant effort to
treat the condition was reported in 1801.8 In that year, Jean-Marc-
Gaspard Itard, a French psychiatrist, wrote of his remarkable
progress with a severely retarded adolescent who had been
abandoned in the forests of Aveyron, France.9  Itard's
3. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("law and justice require"
adequate treatment for the mentally ill).
4. C. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D. N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The Olson trial occurred in 1982. Id. at 475. Olson was the first decision to
recognize that North Dakota is legally obligated to accord developmentally disabled persons the
constitutional guarantees of privacy, private property, and free association. Id. at 491-92.
5. See 0. KOLSTOE, B. GEARHEART & S. HOFFELT, A REPORT TO THE. NORTH DAKOTA PUBLIC
WEtLFARE DEPARTMENT ON A SURVEY OF SERVICES FOR THE.MENTALY RETARDED IN NORTH DAKOTA
(Sept. 15, 1970). The survey recorded North Dakota's attempts to develop the abilities of persons
with mental retardation in 1970. Id. (survey introductory letter from Oliver P. Kolstoe to the North
Dakota Public Welfare Board). The report concluded that, as of 1970, North Dakota provided only
emergency services to the developmentally disabled. See id. (summary of findings and
recommendations). In addition to the emergency services provided, the report recommended that
North Dakota provide developmentally disabled persons with the opportunity to become assets to
society. Id. Thus, the report made 23 recommendations to rectify the situation. See id.
6. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
Olson, see infta notes 117-224 and accompanying text.
7. See ,eneraliy L. KANNER, A HISTORY OF THE.CARE AND STUDY OF THE.MENTAI.LY RETARDED
(1964). Kanner found an "almost nonexistence" of early references to persons with mental
retardation. Id. at 3. Most ancient literature references were to wealthy Romans who used
(levelopmentally disabled persons as "fools" or "jesters" for the amusement of family and guests.
Id. at 5. Kanner's research uncovered only two sympathetic figures before the 18th century - a
fourth century Bishop of Myra, who protected the "feebleminded," and an Egyptian philanthropist
who sheltered the homeless and handicapped. Id. at 3-4.
8. See Humphrey, Introduction toJ. ITARD, THE.WILD BoY OF AVEYRON (1962).
9. Id. at xvii. When Itard first encountered the boy of Aveyron, the child lacked even primitive
skills such as walking and sitting in a chair. Id. at xiii. Furthermore, the boy's elementary modes of
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documentation of his success with the Aveyron child inspired
another French psychiatrist, Eduardo Sequin, to begin work with
the mentally retarded. 10 The early work of Itard and Sequin is
primarily responsible for present day educational and behavioral
treatment modalities, as well as current treatment theory. I"
The work of Itard and Sequin, however, was largely
abandoned and ignored during the latter part of the 19th century. 12
During this time period, psychiatrists and others began to actively
promote several theories that precipitated decades of disaster for
persons with mental retardation.' 3 For example, professionals in
the 19th century believed that mental retardation was caused soley
by defects in brain development. 14 Also, during this time period
persons with mental retardation were regarded as social
deviants and misfits. 5 During the first half of the 20th century,
persons with mental retardation were herded into inexpensive
institutions where they were segregated for life. In these
institutions, mentally retarded individuals were sterilized,
dehumanized, and deprived of even the most basic human and
legal rights.16  Mentally retarded persons in North Dakota,
unfortunately, did not escape the prevailing process of
dehumanization. '7
Presently, despite the substantial progress made in rebutting
the myths surrounding mental retardation, many lay and
professional persons remain influenced by negative misconceptions
of persons with mental retardation. 18 These misconceptions have
been categorized as follows:
response were extraordinarily apathetic. Id. He did not sneeze, and hardly responded to the sound of
a gun firing. Id. After two years, however, Itard turned the child into "a human being; clean,
affectionate, even able to read a few words and to understand much that was said to him." Id. at xii.
10. See Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment /or Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving
Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGcHTON L. REv. 124, 127 n.6 (1976) [hereinafter Mason &
Menolascinol (citing E. SEQUIN, THE.MORAI TREATMENT, HYGIENE AND EDUCATION OF IDIOTS AND
OTHtER BACKWARD CHILDREN 89 (1848)).
11. Seeid. at 128 n.6.
12. See generally id. at 127-38 (charting the evolution of treatment theories for the
developmentally disabled).
13. See id. at 129.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Seeid. at 133.
17. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 25-04.1-01 (1978) (superintendent of the Grafton State School
may recommend sterilization for the protection of society or to improve the physical and mental
health of a resident) (repealed 1979); id. 5 14-03-07 (1981) (an institutionalized severely retarded
woman may not marry until she is 45 years old). In North Dakota institutionalization of persons with
mental retardation became the chosen treatment; the population of the Grafton State School grew
from 75 persons in 1904 to more than 1400 persons in 1966. Grafton State School, Report on Trends
at the Grafton State School I (Jan. 28, 1981) (prepared by, and available from, Grafton State School
in Grafton, North Dakota).
18. See Roos, Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, I LEGAi. RIGHTS OF MENTAI.Iy DSABI.EO
PERSONS 127, 129 (1979) [hereinafter Roosi.
1987]
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1. The subhuman organism - the retarded are
viewed as lacking many of the needs, aspirations and
sensitivities of other human beings. Their human and
legal rights can therefore be curtailed or ignored. They
are allowed minimal freedom and are managed much as
animals.
2. The menace - the retarded are viewed as a threat
to society because of their criminal tendencies or because
of their wanton reproduction of defective children. They
must, therefore, be contained and isolated. Society needs
protection from them so that prison-like institutions are
necessary to control the retarded.
3. The object of pity - the retarded are viewed as
"suffering" and should be lovingly nurtured and
protected. Emphasis is placed on keeping them
contented, but they are not treated with respect or
dignity.
4. The eternal child - the retarded are viewed as
persons who will always be much younger than their age.
They should, therefore, be treated as children and kept as
"happy" as possible. This model leads to overprotection
and curtailment of opportunities for the retarded to
develop into mature persons.
5. The diseased organism - the retarded are
perceived as sick and in need of "treatment" and
"hospitalization." Dependency, safety, cleanliness, and
comfort are stressed with emphasis on medical services.
Since there is no known technique available at this time to
regenerate human brian tissue, many retarded persons
are viewed as "hopeless" and are assigned to indefinite
"custodial" care. 19
These misconceptions are not consistent with the basic definition of
mental retardation, 20 nor are they consistent with prevailing
treatment principles.
The term "mental retardation" has acquired a negative
connotation. 2' This is primarily due to a misunderstanding of the
19. Id. at 130-31.
20. For a definition of mental retardation, see supra note 1.
21. See ClASSIFICATION, supra note 1. The terms "idiot." "imbecile," and "oron" have all
been used to describe the mentally retarded population. Id. These terms have been employed to
s('gregate persons with mental retardation from persons without mental retardation by portraying
persons with mental retardation as unable to develop or learn and thus, less than human. See Mason
& Menolascino, supra note 10, at 124 n. 1.
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concept of retardation, and a perpetuation of many of the
misconceptions that surround persons labeled "retarded. "122 More
than 250 different factors are hypothesized as closely or casually
related to. mental retardation; 23 yet there exists no identifiable
biologic or organic cause for retardation in seventy-five percent of
persons classified as "mentally retarded." ' 24 Absent an organic
explanation for retardation, professionals have concluded that
retardation is caused more often by sociocultural or environmental
deprivations than by organic factors. 25  Indeed, the standard
definition of "mental retardation" does not distinguish between
retardation associated with psychosocial or polygenic influences
and retardation associated with biological deficits. 26
Three percent of the population will, at some time in their
lives, function within the range of mental retardation. 27 However,
no more than 1.1 % of the population is functioning in the mentally
retarded range at any given time.28  Approximately 89% of
retarded persons are mildly retarded, 6% are moderately retarded,
and only 5 % are severely or profoundly retarded. 2
9
The treatment modality that is generally accepted today is the
developmental model. 30  The developmental model stresses the
22. See Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 127-30 (discussing the misconceptions
surrounding mental retardation).
23. SeeRoos, supra note 18, at 131.
24. See id.
25. See L. KANNER, CHILD PSYCHIATRY 86 (1935) (psychological disorders involve many factors,
and it is "inconceivable to deal with them apart from the consideration, examination, and utilization
of the environmental setting").
26. See CLASSIFICATION, supra note 1, at 25-26. The diagnosis of mental retardation is made on
the basis of comparing a person's intellectual functioning and behavioral standards to other persons
of the same age group. Id. Intelligence tests measure potential for performance and measurements of
adaptive behavior determine a person's present performance. Id. at 43. Consideration of these
measurements in relation to an individual's own chronological age group assures flexibility of status.
See id. at 26. A person may meet the criteria of mental retardation at one time and not at another time
due to change of circumstances, including "alterations in intellectual functioning, adaptive
behavior, or societal expectations." Id. See generally Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 124 n.1
(tracing the history of the definition of mental retardation and discussing criteria used for diagnosis).
27. Tarjan, Wright, Eyman & Keeran, Natural History of Mental Retardation: Some Aspects of
Epiderniology, 77 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 369, 370 (1973). Differences in prevalence rates of
mental retardation range from less than one percent to twenty percent, depending upon the
methodological sampling and definitional differences between studies. Conley, Mental Retardation: An
Economist's Approach, MENTAL RETARDATION, Dec. 1976, at 20.
28. Conley, supra note 27, at 20.
29. Roos, supra note 18, at 132.
30. See id. at 133 (the developmental model is the emerging ideology concerning the
developmentally disabled). The developmental model concludes that the human being, like any life
form, is in a state of change from conception until death; that the development proceeds in a
sequential and predictable manner; and that the rate and direction of development can be influenced
by a variety of factors, including the degree of intervention and the nature of the environmental
setting. Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 137 n.32 (citing P. Roos, G. PATTERSON & B.
MCCANN, EXPANDING THE.DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL (1970)). Accordingly, the developmental model
posits that developmental programs for mentally retarded persons must be individually designed to
increase, decrease, or modify the individual's rate of behavioral change. See id.
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consistent and systematic provision of habilitative 31 services to
remedy identified delays in specific areas of function. 32 These
services must be provided as early as possible to minimize the
effects of the disability.33 Moreover, because mental retardation is
often associated with environmental rather than organic causes, 34
and because the structure of the environment in which any
habilitative services are provided is an important factor in a
person's ability to learn,3 5 the developmental model stresses the
location at which the habilitative services are performed. 36
Professional recognition of the importance of the location of
habilitative services is embodied in the principle of
"normalization." "Normalization" refers to the use of means that
are as culturally normal as possible to elicit and maintain behaviors
and characteristics that are as culturally normal as possible. 37
Deviation from normal living arrangements is justified only to the
extent that the deviations prove more successful in developing
normal behaviors and in fostering developmental gains. 38
Institutions designed to segregate persons with mental retardation
from society represent abnormal living arrangements; thus,
residents of these institutions will behave abnormally. 39
Recognition of the developmental model and the principle of
normalization led to a reassessment of the policy of segregating
persons with mental retardation through institutionalization.
Given the misconceptions that gave rise to the segregation of
persons with mental retardation in large scale institutions, it is not
surprising that the documented effects of institutionalization upon
mentally retarded persons are devastating, albeit predictable:
31. "Habilitation" refers to the process by which a person is assisted in acquiring and
maintaining those life skills that enable one to cope more effectively with the lemands of person and
environment. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom.,
Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The skills developed through habilitativc
services enable the individual to raise the level of his or her physical, mental, and social efficiency. Id.
The term "treatment," although sometimes incorrectly used synonymously with the term
"habilitation," refers to the prevention, amelioration, and cure of a person's physical disabilities or
illnesses. Id.
32. See Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 139-40. The authors state that "the overall
thrust of modern habilitation is the remediation of the delayed learning process so as to develop the
maximum growth potential by the acquisition of self-help, language, personal, social, educational,
vocational, and recreational skills." Id.
33. Id. at 140 (noting that treatment should begin as early as possible because the first years of
life are when most basic human learning occurs).
34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
36. See Mason & Menolascino, supra note 10, at 137 n.33.
37. Id. at 136 n.31 (normalization stresses the retarded individual's ''right to live a life as close
to the normal as possible.")
38. Roos, supra note 18, at 135.
39. Id. ("facilities Ithati differ from culturally normative living arrangements will generate
behavior Ithat] deviates from the cultural norm").
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residents are abused by staff, the forms of mistreatment include
neglect, verbal abuse, physical beatings, overuse of mind altering
drugs, use of shackles, and other barbaric forms of punishment; 40
residents frequently experience a reduction in intelligence scores41
and an increase in maladaptive behaviors;4 2 interaction between
residents and nonresidents drops substantially; 43 residents become
excessively dependent, imitative, conforming, apathetic, isolated,
or anxious for attention; 44 and skills acquired in an institutional
setting may not accompany the person to another setting,, in other
words, skills may not be generalized across environments.4 5
The effects of institutionalization vary between institutions
and the different types of community facilities.4 6 Multiple studies
suggest, however, that smaller, community based facilities most
effectively meet the needs of persons with mental retardation. 47
Probably the most comprehensive comparison of institutional and
community based care is the Pennhurst study, which documented
the progress of residents who were integrated from institutions into
40. Seegenerally B. BLATT, ExoDUS FROM PANDEMONIUM: HUMAN ABUSE AND A REFORMATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 13-19 (1970) (discussing the horrors discovered upon touring institutions for the
developmentally disabled).
41. See Transcript of Testimony of Earl C. Butterfield at 41, Association for Retarded Citizens
v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). Butterfield testified
that "I.Q. scores are depressed by long-term congregate living." Id. Butterfield surmised that this
general finding applies to mildly mentally handicapped individuals and not to more severely
mentally handicapped individuals because I.Q. measures of severely retarded individuals are
Unreliable. Id.
42. See B. Byrne, The Culture of a State School Ward (1973) (doctoral dissertation series 74-
17,570, available at Syracuse University) (observations at the Eaton State School disclosed an
increase in maladaptive behaviors partially due to the institutional program implementors' apathy
and low expectations regarding residents' future development).
43. See Baroff, On "Size" and the Quality of Residential Care: A Second Look, 18 MENTAL
RETARDATION 113, 114 (1980) [hereinafter Baroff (noting that persons with mental retardation in
noninstitutional settings receive more individual attention than those in institutions).
44. See Zigler & Balla, Impact of Institutional Experience on the Behavior and Development of Retarded
Persons, 82 AM. J. OF. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 1, 2 (1977) (discussing the effects of social deprivations
suffered by persons with mental retardation in institutions).
45. See Stokes & Baer, An Implicit Technology of Generalization, 10 J. oF APPLIED BEHAYIOR
ANALYSIS 349, 354 (1977).
46. Seegenerally Baroff, supra note 43. Baroff conducted a survey which revealed that three types
of residences exist for people with mental retardation. Id. at 113. The larger institutions, which
Baroff termed "mental deficiency hospitals," serve from 121 to 1,650 residents. Id. The midsize
residences, which Barrof termed "voluntary homes," housed between 50 and 93 residents. Id. The
smaller residences, which Barrof called "group homes" or "hostels," housed between 12 and 41
residents. Id. The survey concluded that group homes provide the most resident oriented services. Id.
Within each of the three types of residences, however, there was no relationship between size and
resident orientation. Id.
47. See, e.g., id. at 113-14. Smaller residences provide more resident oriented services, and the
staff of small residences are more likely to possess a genuine interest in the growth of persons with
mental retardation. Id.; see also Balla, Relationship of Institutional Size to Quality of Care. A Review of the
Literature, 81 AM. J. OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 117 (1976) (resident oriented care practices emphasized
in community based facilities); Baroff, supra note 43, at 114 (individualized attention is more
prevalent in community.based facilities); Dellinger & Shope, Selected Characteristics and Working
Conditions of Direct Service Staff in Pennsylvania CLA's, 16 MENTAL RETARDATION 19, 20 (1978)
(experienced, trained, and motivated direct care staff available in community based facilities).
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community living arrangements pursuant to the court order in
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital.48 After five years of
analysis, the authors of the study concluded that persons with
mental retardation who were moved from the institution to small
community residences were, in every way measured, higher
functioning than persons remaining in the institution.4 9 Given the
documented disadvantages of institutionalization, and the
advantages associated with community placement, many
professionals are advocating community placement for all persons
with mental retardation.50
II. A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF INSTITUTIONALIZA-
TION
Professionals generally recognize that institutionalization is
inappropriate for the vast majority of mentally retarded persons.51
This recognition is amply demonstrated by the low number of
persons with mental retardation who remain institutionalized
under the authority of mental health professionals. In 1950,
128,145 mentally retarded individuals resided in institutions.5 2
That number increased every year until 1967, when it reached a
high of 193,188. 53 Since 1967, however, the number of mentally
retarded persons in institutions has declined every year, to a recent
low of 103,297 persons in 1985. 54 These figures suggest that
48. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), modified, 673 F.2d
647 (3d Cir. 1982); J. Conroy & V. Brodley, The Pennhurst Longitudinal Study: A Report of Five
Years of Research and Analysis (Mar. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Pennhurst Study] (available at Temple
University, Developmental Disability Center, Philadelphia, Pa.) For a discussion of the Pennhurst
Study, see infra note 49. In Pennhurst the plaintiffs were persons with mental retardation who claimed
they were denied their rights guaranteed by the first, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), modified, 673 F.2d 647 (3d. Cir. 1982).
The court concluded that those amendments granted persons with mental retardation the right to'
minimally adequate habilitation, freedom from harm, and nondiscriminatory habilitation. Id. at
1318, 1320,1321.
49. See Pennhurst Study, supra note 48, at 322. The study measured adaptive and maladaptive
behavior, consumer satisfaction, quality of environment, family impacts, neighborhood attitudes,
and costs. Id. at 314-27. The authors concluded that persons with mental retardation who were
deinstitutionalized were better off than those persons that were institutionalized because the
deinstitutionalized were happier, their adaptive behavior had increased, their environments were
better, and their families perceive them as happier. Id.
50. Taylor, Observation Report Grafton State School and San Haven State Hospital 13 (June
1979) [hereinafter Taylor] (available from Steven Taylor, professor of Special Education and
Rehabilitation, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York).
51. See id.
52. Butterfield, Some Basic Changes in Residential Facilities, CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL
SERVICES FOR THE.MENTALLY RETARDED 15 (President's Committee on Mental Retardation 1976)
(providing statistical data on institutionalization from 1950 to 1971).
53. Id.
54. See R. SCHEERENBERGER, PUBLIC RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE.MENTALLY RETARDED 1985,
4 (1986) (survey of state public residential facilities).
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institutionalization is increasingly disfavored, while other options,
such as home and community based care, are becoming the
preferred mode of treatment.
The welfare of persons with mental retardation may not be the
only reason why deinstitutionalization is so warmly embraced on a
national basis. A positive correlation exists between the size of a
developmental facility and expenditures: as the size of a facility
increases, per capita expenditures also increase. 55 As a part of the
Pennhurst longitudinal study, John Ashbaugh, the director of the
cost study component of the Pennhurst study, performed a
comparative cost analysis which concluded that community based
residential care was less costly than institutional care for clients of
similar adaptive behavior, age, and medical need. 56
North Dakota data also support Ashbaugh's conclusion. As of
July 1, 1985, the daily expenditure per person at the Grafton State
School was.$151.33.57 The San Haven division of the Grafton State
School reported a similar per day expenditure of $179.91. 51 In
contrast, the average daily expenditure per person in .an
intermediate care facility, which provides twenty-four hour
residential care, was $79.85. 59  Thus, in North Dakota,
approximately fifty percent of care costs can be saved by placing
mentally retarded persons in community based facilities.
In addition to fiscal concerns and the acceptance of
"normalization" as factors contributing to deinstitutionalization,
one other factor has substantially affected the method of treating
persons with mental retardation. This factor is the evolution of
legal principles regarding the rights of mentally retarded persons.
III. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Rouse v. Cameron60 is generally regarded as the first case in
which a right to treatment for institutionalized mentally retarded
55. See Pennhurst Study, supra note 48. at 221-22 (discussing a prior survey conducted on per
diem cost).
5b. See id. at 226. The cost of community care was only 70% of the cost of institutional care. Id.;
see also Murphy & Datel, A Cost - Benefit Analysis of Community Versus Institutional Living, 27 HOSPITAL
AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 165, 169 (1976) (the deinstitutionalization of 52 persons resulted in a
savings of $20,800 per person over a 10 year period). Other studies have indicated that institutional
care is not dramatically more expensive than certain types of community care. See, e.g., Intagliata,
Wilder & Cooley, Cost Comparison of Institutional and Community Based Alternatives for Mentally Retarded
Persons, 17 MENTAL RETARDATION 154, 155 (1979) (cost of residential care in group homes approaches
that of institutions).
57. Letter from Dr. Darvin Hirsch to Michael .J. Williams (Sept. 1986) (discussing daily
expenditures for Grafton State School and community group home residents).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19 871
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persons was recognized. Although Rouse was decided on statutory
grounds, strong dictum indicated that the failure to recognize the
mentally retarded persons's right to treatment would raise serious
constitutional questions concerning due process, equal protection,
and cruel and unusual punishment. 61 Today, two decades after the
Rouse decision, the parameters of the right to treatment are still not
authoritatively delimited.
Charles Rouse was charged with carrying a dangerous
weapon. 62 As a defense to this charge, Rouse pleaded innocent by
reason of insanity. 63 A municipal court found Rouse not guilty by
reason of insanity and Rouse was involuntarily committed. 64 On
appeal the issue before the court was whether a person involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital, after being acquitted of a criminal
offense by reason of insanity, has a right to treatment. 65 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that Rouse was entitled to treatment. 66 The precedential
significance of the Rouse decision was limited, however, because the
decision was based on statutory grounds. 67
Subsequent to Rouse, numerous courts held that
institutionalized persons with mental retardation possess a right to
habilitation that is sufficient to require the state to provide them
with a reasonable opportunity to improve their condition. 68 This
61. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 452. Pursuant to District of Columbia law, carrying a dangerous weapon is a
misdemeanor for which the maximum imprisonment is one year. Id.; see D. C. CODE ENCYCL. $ 22-
3215 (West 1967).
63. See 373 F.2d at 452.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 456. The court in Rouse defined the right to treatment as including psychiatric care in
addition to contacts and activities with the staff designed to cure and improve the patient. Id.
67. See id. at 455-56. The statute which the court relied upon in holding that Rouse was entitled
to the right of treatment provided:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The
administrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all medical and
psychiatric care and treatment received by a person hospitalized for a mental illness
and the records shall be made available, upon that person's written authorization, to
his attorney or personal physician....
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. S 21-562 (West 1967)
68. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (residents' liberty interests require
the state to provide minimally adequate training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint);
Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 374 (4th Cir.) (recommended treatment must be reasonable
and adaptable to the circumstances of each case), ceri. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
235 (1986); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Cir. 1977). (obligation to adequately
habilitate does not yield to financial considerations); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th
Cir. 1974) (mental patients have a constitutional right to individual treatments that will help improve
their mental condition); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (essential
elements of minimally adequate treatment include a humane environment, qualified staff, and
individualized treatment plans); Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 615 (D.R.1. 1978)
(appropriate treatment maximizes a person's developmental potential, and does not merely maintain
a person's skill level), aff'd, 506 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
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right to habilitation is premised upon multiple theories. First, some
court opinions suggest that confinement of persons with mental
retardation without habilitation may constitute inipermissible
incarceration based on status. 69 Second, other courts have held that
the state, by confining mentally retarded persons, voluntarily
assumes a parens patriae duty to furnish habilitation. 7 0 These courts
reason that a state assumes this obligation because, by requiring
confinement, the state forecloses other possibilities for
habilitation. 71 Third, courts have held that habilitation is the quid
pro quo for the massive deprivation of liberty rights accompanied by
institutionalization. 72  These courts reason that, because
involuntary commitment is a curtailment of liberty far more
oppressive than criminal incarceration, the commitment can be
justified only by a permissible governmental interest. 3 Since a
person is incarcerated because of his or her mental disability, the
state's justification in these cases must be the need to provide
adequate care or treatment. 74 Thus, the state is prevented from
denying the need for habilitation because the need for habilitation
is the state's justification for the institutionalization. 75 Variations
and combinations of these theories are the theoretical justifications
for concluding that institutionalized persons with mental
retardation possess a broad right to habilitation. 76
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (minimally adequate habilitation includes a
program that reasonably affords persons the opportunity to maintain life skills that enable them to
cope as effectively as their capacity permits), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), modified, 673 F.2d
647 (3d Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (E.D. La. 1976)
(institutionalized developmentally disabled children have the right to individualized treatment
programs designed to help them achieve their maximum human potential).
69. Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, rehg'denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962). In Robinson the
United States Supreme Court reviewed a California statute that made the status of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense. Id. at 666. The Supreme Court analogized the status of drug addiction with the
status of being mentally ill, a leper, or afflicted with venereal disease. Id. In light of social disapproval
of punishing an individual based on status, the Supreme Court concluded that a state law which
imprisons a person for the status of drug addiction inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment as applied to states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
666-67; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding cruel and unusual punishment).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 300 (D. Md. 1979). The court in Solomon
recognized a state's right to exercise its parens patriae power to institutionalize its citizens with mental
retardation. Id. at 300. The court then concluded that an individual's right to treatment was the right
reciprocal to the state's exercise of its parens patriae power to institutionalize persons with mental
retardation. Id.
71. See id. at 279-312.
72. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976). In Gary W. the
court addressed the adequacy of institutional care given to mentally and emotionally handicapped
children who had been institutionalized by the state. Id. at 1212-13. The court found that the
children had a due process right to individualized treatment programs designed to help them develop
to their fullest potential. See id. at 1216-17, 1225.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 1216-17.
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). The plaintiffs in Philipp were
mentally retarded residents of a state owned institution. Id. at 515. The plaintiffs alleged that they
Ixn
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The rights of an institutionalized developmentally disabled
person were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo. 77 Nicholas Romeo, a thirty-three year old man,
had been diagnosed as profoundly retarded. 78 At the age of twenty-
six, Nicholas was committed to the Pennhurst State School and
Hospital. 79 While at Pennhurst, Nicholas suffered multiple injuries
and was physically restrained. 80 Nicholas alleged that, under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, he was entitled to
a safe environment that would have reduced the likelihood of
violence, injury, and the need for bodily restraint.8 ' Nicholas also
alleged that, under the same clause, he was entitled to training and
habilitation.8 2 The United States Supreme Court unanimously
recognized that persons cannot, consistent with substantive due
process, be deprived of the following rights: (1) Reasonable care
and safety;8 3 (2) freedom from bodily restraint;84 (3) adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care;8 5 and (4) adequate training or
habilitation necessary to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint. 86
were receiving inappropriate programs and services, and that some of the residents were capable of
functioning in less restrictive community settings. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that their unnecessary
and improper confinement violated several constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. The court
discussed both the quid pro quo and the paretns patriaejustifications for the mentally retarded's right to
treatment. Id. at 516. For a discussion of the quid pro quo justification, see supra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the parens patriae justification, see supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text. The court then concluded that both involuntarily and voluntarily committed
persons possess a substantial liberty interest in being free from unnecessary confinement. Id. at 518-
19. The court suggested that the state provide treatment for the residents as a means of safeguarding
the committed person's liberty interests. Id. Treatment, according to the court, includes training in
an appropriate, least restrictive setting to maintain self-help skills and raise the level of physical,
mental, and social functioning. Id. at 516, 518.
77. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg the mother of a mentally retarded individual filed a civil
rights suit against a Pennsylvania state institution. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (1982).
The mother claimed that her son had been denied his constitutional rights to safe conditions of
confinement, freedom from bodily restraint, and training or habilitation. See id. at 310-11.
78. Id. at 309. Nicholas had the mental capacity of an 18 month-old child and an I.Q. score of
between 8 and 10. Id. At the time of trial he could not talk and possessed few of the most basic self-
care skills. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 310. The complaint alleged that Nicholas suffered injuries on 63 different occasions.
Id.
81. Id. at 309; seeU.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, S 1 (due process clause).
82. 457 U.S. at 309.
83. Id. at 315-16. The Court concluded that the right to personal security constitutes a "historic
liberty interest" protected substantively by the due process clause. Id. at 315. The Court also stated
that this "right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes." Id.
Accordingly, the Court held that the institutionalized possess a right to be held under safe conditions.
Id. at 316.
84. Id. The Court stated that "liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized
as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action."
Id. (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)). The Court concluded that, since this interest survives criminal
incarceration, "it must also survive involuntary commitment." Id.
85. Id. at 315. All parties in Romeo conceded that the involuntarily committed have a fight to
"adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care." Id.
86. Id. at 319.
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The Supreme Court, however, carefully limited its decision to
the "circumstances presented by this case." 8 7 Moreover, the Court
declined to address the existence of other rights, such as a general
right to habilitation. 88  The concurring opinion of Justice
Blackmun, however, indicates that a broader right to habilitation
for persons with mental retardation may enjoy the support of the
Court:
The second difficult question left open today is
whether respondent has an independent constitutional
claim, grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to that "habilitation" or
training necessary to preserve those basic self-care skills he
possessed when he first entered Pennhurst - for
example, the ability to dress himself and care for his
personal hygiene. In my view, it would be consistent with
the Court's reasoning today to include within the
''minimally adequate training required by the
Constitution," such training as is reasonably necessary to
prevent a person's pre-existing self-care skills from
deteriorating because of his commitment. 89
Although the majority opinion did not address a right to training
beyond the training necessary for safe confinement and freedom
from physical restraint, Justice Blackmun suggested that the
Court's opinion might be read to support a broader right to
treatment. 90
Although the state may constitutionally institutionalize a
person with mental retardation for purposes of habilitation, the
state cannot deprive an individual of more liberty than is necessary
to provide effective habilitation.9 This legal concept is known as
the least restrictive alternative, and has been applied by the
Supreme Court in a variety of factual settings. 92
87. Id.
88. Id. at 316 n. 19, 319.
89. Id. at 327 (Blackmun,.]., concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
90. See id.
91. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.N.D. 1981) ("all
developmentally disabled persons have a right to appropriate treatment, services and habilitation for
those disabilities in the least [restrictive] appropriate setting"); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 542 F. Supp. 619, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (adequate habilitation should be
accomplished in community living arrangements because they are less restrictive of individual
liberties than are institutional settings).
92. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960) (highlighting several Supreme Court
cases invoking the least restrictive means analysis). In Tucker the United States Supreme Court
recognized that a state's power to abridge individual rights must be restricted to the least drastic
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Prior to Youngberg, courts were fairly uniform in concluding
that persons with mental retardation have a right to habilitation in
the least restrictive appropriate setting.93 Subsequent to Youngberg,
however, courts have reached varying results in deciding whether-
mentally retarded persons are entitled to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment. 94 For example, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the right to the least restrictive setting
is applicable only if recommended by a responsible professional. 95
The court's decision was predicated on the fact that the due process
clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Youngberg
decision, does not require the least restrictive setting. 96 The court
also concluded, however, that Youngberg does require the state to
give great deference to the judgment of a qualified professional
concerning what treatment would best serve a particular person
with mental retardation. 97 Thus, if a qualified professional suggests
the least restrictive setting, then it is possible that, in that specific
situation, the least restrictive setting might be constitutionally
mandated. 98 Generally, qualified professionals recommend the
least restrictive setting. 99
means for achieving the purpose of abridgment. Id. The Court reached this conclusion by reasoning
that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be'
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." Id. The least restrictive alternative has been expanded to numerous areas of
individual rights. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254, 267 (1974) (right of
interstate travel); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (right of assembly);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of privacy); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963) (right of religious freedom).
93. See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.N.D. 1981);
Halderman v. Pernhurst State School & Hosp., 542 F. Supp. 619, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
94. Compare Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir.) (right to least restrictive
alternative exists when less restrictive setting recommended by responsible professional), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1992, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986) and Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson,
561 F. Supp. 473, 486 (D.N.D. 1982) (right to least restrictive method of treatment exists when these
alternatives would measurably enhance liberty interests), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); with
Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1251 (2d Cir. 1984) (no
absolute right to community placement) and Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.
1983) (no affirmative duty for state to provide less restrictive community residential setting).
95. See Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992, cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986).
96. See id.; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (requiring only that state
provide the minimal care necessary to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint). For a
discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
97. Thomas, 781 F.2d at 374-75; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982). For a
discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text. The court in Thomas noted that
the Youngberg decision "recognized that it is not feasible to specify the type of training for every
case." Thomas, 781 F.2d at 374. The court stated that "in determining what is reasonable 'in any
case presenting a claim for training by a State . . . courts must show deference to the judgment
exercised by a qualified professional."' Id. at 375 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322). The
judgment permitting or denying a less restrictive alternative must be based upon professionally
acceptable criteria, and not upon exigency, administrative convenience, or other nonmedical
criteria. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert.
dnied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986).
98. See Thomas, 781 F.2d at 374-75.
99. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 50, at 13-14. Taylor suggests that Grafton and San Haven should
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IV. THE NORTH DAKOTA EXPERIENCE: ASSOCIATION
FOR RETARDED CITIZENS V. OLSON
In 1904, the North Dakota Constitution was amended to
provide for an institution for the "feebleminded" to be located at
or near the City of Grafton, North Dakota.100 The purpose of the
institution was to provide care and treatment for persons with
mental retardation.i °i Initially, the state transferred seventy-five
individuals from the Jamestown State Hospital to Grafton. i02 In
1957, the San Haven facility in Dunseith, originally constructed as
a tuberculosis sanitarium, merged into the Grafton State School.10 3
It was not until 1961, however, that the State of North Dakota
established the State Mental Health Authority, an organization
created to provide services and information relating to mental
health and mental retardation. 0 4 Although the Authority was
primarily responsible for the development of community based
programs,o 5 few programs were actually established. The Grafton
State School was the exclusive treatment facility for persons with
mental retardation until the 1970s, and it remained the primary
treatment facility for persons with mental retardation until a recent
expansion of the community based system ordered by Association for
Retarded Citizens v. Olson. 106
Although the Grafton State School was the exclusive treatment
facility for persons with mental retardation, the institution was
undertake an aggressive program of deinstitutionalization of their residents because that would be
the least restrictive alternative and would be in the best interests of the residents. See id.
100. See N.D. CONST. art IX, 5 12(8). Subsection 12(8) of article IX of the North Dakota
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[T]here shall be located at or near the city of
Grafton, in the county of Walsh, an institution for the feebleminded, on the grounds purchased by*
the secretary of the interior for a penitentiary building." Id.
!01. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-04-02 (1978). Section 25-04-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides as follows: "The state school shall be maintained for the relief, instruction, care, and
custody of the mentally deficient of this state. For this purpose the director may introduce and
establish such trades and manual industries as in his judgment will best prepare the residents for
future self-support." Id.
102. Grafton State School, Report on Trends at the Grafton State School I (Jan. 28, 1981)
(prepared by, and available from, Grafton State School in Grafton, North Dakota).
103. SeeAct of Mar. 20, 1957, ch. 197, 1957 N.D. Laws 393 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 25-
04-01 (Supp. 1985)). When the North Dakota Legislature appropriated money for a new tuberculosis
sanitorium to be constructed in Grand Forks, the legislature also appropriated money for the
renovation of San Haven "for the care of the feebleminded." See id.
104. See Act of Mar. 16, 1961, ch. 208, 51, 1961 N.D. Laws 314, 314. The Authority merged
into the Department of Human Services, which contains the subdivisions of developmental
disabilities, mental health, social services, vocational rehabilitation, and alcoholism and drug abuse.
See Act of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 486, S 12, 1981 N.D. Laws 1338, 1343 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S
25-10-01 (Supp. 1985)).
105. See Act of Mar. 16, 1961, ch. 208, S l(e), 1961 N.D. Laws 314, 314 (the Mental Health
Authority is responsible for providing rehabilitation services for persons with mental, emotional, and
developmental disabilities).
106. 561 F. Supp. 473, 494 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 731 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). For a
discussion of Olson, see infra notes 117-224 and accompanying text.
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neither funded nor staffed at a level sufficient to provide adequate
habilitative services to its residents.10 7 Prior to 1980, the Grafton
State School administration consistently requested, without
success, additional staff and budget increases necessary to provide
those services that the law required. 108
The chronic underfunding produced predictable results. The
residents lived under crowded and unsanitary conditions, which
facilitated the spread of infectious diseases and parasites.10 9
Habilitative programs were lacking, residents were frequently
observed rocking and banging their heads against objects,
behaviors which indicate boredom.110 Moreover, there was little
staff initiated interaction with residents."1 1 The impetus for change
did not begin, however, until the conditions at Grafton and San
Haven were brought to the public eye. In June of 1979, Dr. Steven
J. Taylor, Assistant Professor of Special Education and
Rehabilitation at Syracuse University, authored the first public
report describing the conditions at Grafton and San Haven. Dr.
Taylor, after a blistering indictment of the lack of care for persons
with mental retardation, concluded that Grafton and San Haven
were "monumental examples of unconstitutionality.'' 1   Dr.
Taylor stated that, because of the inadequate training, shortage of
direct care and professional staff, over-crowding, and the use of
obnoxious restraining devices, the state denied residents at San
Haven and Grafton the right to treatment, education, freedom
from harm, and humane living conditions."13
107. See Taylor, supra note 50, at 8. Taylor's report stated that, as of 1979, most wards had only
two or three staff persons. Id. One ward had one staff person responsible for over 30 severely and
profoundly retarded adults. Id. Moreover, in one ward, only two staff persons were assigned to care
for 126 residents at night. Id.
108. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF FOR THE. BUDGET SECTION OF THE. NORTH DAKOTA
IECISLATURE, ANALYSIS OF GRAFTON STATE SCHOOL AND SAN HAVEN STATE HOSPITAL
APPROPRIATIONS AND NEW POSITIONS FROM THE.1971-73 BIENNIUM THROUGH THE.1979-81 BIENNIUM
1-2 (Sept. 1979). For example, the following is a chart providing the budget and staff request by
Grafton and San Haven, and the actual budget and staff granted to San Haven and Grafton for the
bienniums beginning in 1971 and ending in 1979:
Year Total GSS Total Staff Legislative Staff
Budget Request Requested Reduction Granted
of Budget
1971 $14,026,527 104 $2,878,387 1
1973 14,977,816 85 2,340,482 13
1975 21,293,473 147 2,311,100 123
1977 24,813,806 37 1,741,788 0
1979 37,408,652 179 9,229,746 12
Id.
109. Taylor, supra note 50, at 8.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Id.
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Shortly thereafter, the North Dakota Medical Association
Commission on Medical Services appointed a subcommittee to
evaluate the physical plant and the quality of medical services at the
Grafton and San Haven complexes. 1 4 The subcommittee, chaired
by Dr. D. Ross Halliday, filed its report on February 18, 1980.115
The subcommittee concluded that serious deficiencies, such as
overcrowding and understaffing, existed at the Grafton State
School, and that there was little justification for continuing the
operation of San Haven at its existing level of function. 116
These two reports, combined with a long history of legislative
neglect, provided the impetus for institutional reform through
litigation. The landmark suit in this litigation is the case of
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson. 117
A. THE-PRETRIAL PHASE
On September 26,. 1980, six individuals and the Association
for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota"1 8 filed a complaint in the
114. See North Dakota Medical Association Commission on Medical Services, Subcommittee
Report on Grafton State School and San Haven State Hospital (Feb. 18, 1980) (available from the
North Dakota Medical Association, Bismarck, North Dakota).
115. See id. (introductory letter).
116. Id. at 18-20. The subcommittee's recommendations concerning Grafton and San Haven
were as follows:
1. Define mission of the facility with its various departments of education and patient
care to allow better institution of expanded programs.
2. Develop a time schedule to meet the long-term goals defined in the Institutional
Charter.
3. Begin immediately to comply with the State and Federal safety requirements for all
buildings.
4. Phase-out the San Haven facility and consolidate the programs in one geographic
site.
5. Promote normalization in patient programming to allow for education and
progressive de-institutionalization of a significant portion of the population.
6. Develop a unit to care for emotionally disturbed mentally retarded patients.
7. Develop an advocacy program independent of the Director of Institutions to
properly represent the residents.
8. Develop vocational programs and provide jobs for the minimally impaired who
currently consider Grafton and San Haven their permanent home.
9. Provide laboratory support systems specifically designed to meet the needs of the
residents.
10. Recruit adequate numbers of qualified professional personnel to institute the
necessary programs. Provide liability coverage for the staff.
11. The North Dakota Medical Association, in conjunction with other professional
associations, provide permanent overview committees to monitor the institutions
and provide recommendations and assistance to improve the quality of care.
12. Attempt to develop a relationship with the University of North Dakota and North
Dakota State University to provide programs to upgrade all services at this
institution.
Id. at 20.
117. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384(8thCir. 1983).
118. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D. 1981), aff'd, 713
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota is a nonprofit
corporation organized to promote the welfare of persons with mental retardation in the State of
North Dakota. See id. at 471.
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United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 1 9
The defendants, were thirteen state officials responsible for
providing institutional and community based programs for
developmentally disabled persons.120 The forty-two page complaint
requested injunctive relief.121 The injunction was designed to cure
violations of the plaintiffs' rights to: (1) protection from harm; (2)
habilitation; (3) education; (4) liberty and privacy; (5) freedom
from discrimination; and (6) other rights under state and federal
law. 122
On January 13, 1981, the district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for certification as a class.1 23 The court certified the class as
the Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota and all
persons who, as of September 26, 1980, and at any time
subsequent, may have been or may become residents of the Grafton
State School, located near Grafton, North Dakota, and San Haven,
located near Dunseith, North Dakota. 124
On November 4, 1981, the district court issued an order
outlining the rights to which class members were entitled. 125 The
order, in pertinent part, provided as follows:
1. (a) That plaintiffs who have been involuntarily
hospitalized have a right under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to receive minimally adequate care and
treatment;
119. Id. The individual plaintiffs included three residents of the Grafton State School, Lindley
Black, Kelli Moriarty, and Philip Dechant. Id. The other individual plaintiffs, Bradley Cossette,
Richard Schneiderhan, and Naomi Jordison, were mentally retarded persons residing in North
Dakota communities. Id.
120. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F;2d 1384, 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The
defendants were Allen I. Olson, Governor of the State of North Dakota; Alton L. Lick, Director of
Institutions; Milton Wisland, Superintendent of Grafton State School; Richard Charrier, Assistant
Superintendent of Grafton State School and Chief Administrative Officer of San Haven Division;
Dr. M.A.K. Lommen, State Health Officer; Sam Ismir, Director of Division of Mental Health,
Department of Human Services; Darvin Hirsch, Director of Division of Developmental Disabilities,
Department of Human Services; Carroll Burchinal, Director of Department of Vocational
Education; Dr..Joseph Crawford, Superintendent of Public Instruction; Gary Gronberg, Director of
Special Education Division of Department of Public Instruction; Dale Moug, Acting Director of
Department of Human Services; James 0. Fine, Director of Division of Vocational Rehabilitation,
Department of Human Services; and Marcellus Hartze, Director of Division of Community
Services, Department of Human Services. Id. at 1384-85.
121. Plaintiff's Complaint at 39-41, Association for Retarded Citizens v. Link, 561 F. Supp.
473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983) (Governor Olson was substituted as the
primary defendant for the then Govenor Link).
122. See id. at 36-42.
123. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Link, No. Al-80-141 (D.N.D. Jan. 13, 1981) (order
granting class action certification) (Governor Olson was substituted as the primary defendant for the
then Governor Link).
124. Id.
125. 561 F. Supp. at 470.
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(b) That plaintiffs who have been voluntarily
hospitalized have a right under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to receive minimally adequate care and
treatment;
2. That plaintiffs who are involuntarily or
voluntarily hospitalized have a comparable right to
receive minimally adequate care and treatment under
Chapter 25-01.2 of the North Dakota Century Code;
3. That the plaintiffs have a right under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 25-01.2-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code to have the defendants
provide to the plaintiffs the least restrictive practicable
alternatives to hospitalization upon involuntary or
voluntary civil commitment; and,
4. That certain practices and conditions at the
Grafton State School and San Haven may constitute
violations of the plaintiffs' rights under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 126
In conjunction with the order outlining the rights of the class
members, the district court issued a second order requiring officials
at the Grafton State School and San Haven to: (1) immediately
improve their administration of medication; (2) restrict the use of
punishment, neglect, abuse, seclusion and physical restraints; (3)
improve their feeding techniques; (4) perform a fire safety
assessment; (5) perform a resident needs assessment; and (6)
immediately hire 125 new staff persons at the Grafton State
School. 127
During the pretrial period, the parties were also involved in
extensive negotiations in an attempt to amicably resolve the lawsuit
through a consent decree. The two principal issues precluding a
consent decree were differences concerning the appointment of a
court monitor, and differences concerning the rate at which
Grafton State School residents would be integrated into community
programs. The issues could not be resolved; accordingly, a trial was
scheduled to commence on.January 28, 1982.128
126. Id, at 4 70- 7 1.
127. See id. at 475.
128. Ser id.
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The district court issued two other significant ancillary orders
immediately prior to and during the trial.' 29 The first order of
significance, issued December 16, 1981, held that the plaintiffs
were the prevailing parties in the lawsuit based on the defendants'
admission of liability, and therefore awarded the plaintiffs interim
attorney fees of $183,197.50 to compensate seven different
attorneys who had rendered services in connection with the
litigation. 130 The award of attorney fees was significant because it
provided the plaintiffs with the ability to complete the trial phase
without additional financial hardship.
The second significant order, issued during the course of the
trial, was precipitated by the defendants' failure to comply with the
order of November 4, 1981, which had directed the state to hire 125
new staff persons for the Grafton State School, 131 and the order of
December 16, 1981, which had directed the state to pay the
plaintiffs' interim attorney fees. 13 2 The court ordered the
defendants to either hire the additional staff or transfer, by
September 1, 1982, all Grafton State School residents to facilities
that were adequately staffed. 1 33 The court also ordered the
defendants to pay interest on the fee award plus all interest paid to
loaning agencies for operational loans. 134
B. THE TRIAL PHASE
The trial commenced on January 28, 1982 and continued
intermittently for thirty-one trial days. 135 The testimony at trial
generally entailed a blistering condemnation of the institutional
care provided at the Grafton State School, including the San Haven
division. For example, Michael L. Cook, the executive director of a
community program for developmentally disabled individuals,
stated the following concerning the conditions at Grafton and San
Haven:
[The institutions] sort of brought back a lot of memories
of the old days in terms of my own experience, and
through my course of observation on those few days, I
found that time and time again I was recalling back when
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
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I worked in situations with severely and profoundly
retarded persons as a direct-care person and many of the
things that I saw reminded me of that, except I felt like we
were much further along 15 years ago than is the case
currently at Grafton and San Haven.
The dehumanizing conditions that I saw were
completely deplorable, the lack of sanitation, the lack of
stimulation on the living units. As I say, it was a place
that I would hate to think of living [in] myself, or having
one of my children live in. . . . There were many
occasions where the nakedness, the lack of privacy, things
which could have been improved even without additional
resources in some cases but by just a little more
sensitivity, just didn't seem to be there.
It's unquestionably one of the worst institutions I've
ever seen. 
136
The testimony at trial revealed that the institutions were
grossly overcrowded.1 3  The overcrowding deprived residents of
any privacy,13 8 interfered with habilitative programs, caused the
rapid spread of infectious diseases,1 39 and was a contributing factor
to abuse of residents by other residents and staff. 140 At the same
time, the facilities were seriously understaffed. 141 Moreover, the
existing staff, already inadequate in number, was not adequately
trained. 42  This overcrowding and understaffing produced
136. Transcript of Testimony of Michael L. Cook at 29-30, Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
137. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D.N.D. 1982),
aft'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). The recommended resident capacity of the Grafton complex was
378, but the actual population at the time of trial was 799. Id. The San Haven branch was similarly
overcrowded. Id.
138. See Transcript of Testimony of Michael L. Cook at 40, Olson (discussing the lack of
privacy). At trial, Mr. Cook stated that the lack of privacy in wards at the Grafton State School made
it difficult to teach modesty. Id. This lack of modesty, Mr. Cook testified, makes community
placement difficult. Id.
139. See Taylor, supra note 50, at 8. Taylor reported that the overcrowded and unhygenic
conditions facilitated the spread of parasites. Id.
140. See Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 481. The court noted that insufficient staff, lack of employee
training, and inadequate facilities were factors contributing to the abuse of residents. Id.
141. Id. at 478. Existent professional staff at San Haven and Grafton were competent and
dedicated. Id. Unfortunately, the state schools suffered from critical shortages in professional, direct
care, and administrative staff. Id.
142. See Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Travis I. Thompson at 60-63, Olson. According to Dr.
Thompson, the supervisory personnel did not possess the training necessary to supervise stall in
habilitative procedures. Id. at 60-61. Besides not having adequate supervision, the staff members
were provided with only a one week orientation training program. Id. at 62-63. This orientation
covered introductory information regarding various programs within the institution, but lacked
specific instruction in programming techniques and procedures. Id. at 63.
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undesirable but foreseeable results. Wards smelled of urine and
feces. 143 Flies and other vermin were present in living and eating
areas. 14 4  Noise levels impeded any effort to communicate. 45
Various physical restraints were inadequately and unsafely used. 146
The environment represented the antithesis of the environment
necessary to provide proper habilitative care. 4 7 Staff to resident
interaction was minimal. 48 This lack of interaction and the lack of
habilitative programs, caused residents to lose many skills which
they may have possessed at the time they were institutionalized. 49
Moreover, these conditions caused residents to learn. inappropriate
self-abusive behaviors. 50
The quality of the medical care at Grafton and San Haven was
inconsistent with the basic survival needs of the residents.' 5 1
Physically handicapped residents were harmed by mishandling,
inappropriate adaptive equipment, and inadequate positioning
techniques. 152  The testimony of Dr. James D. Clements, a
consultant for persons with mental retardation and related
disabilities, best summarized the prevailing conditions at the
Grafton State School:
My reaction to visiting Grafton and San Haven, I
guess, was one of basically distress and disgust, not at the
143. Id. at 51.
144. Transcript of Testimony of Michael L. Cook at 50-51, Olson.
145. Transcript of Testimony of Dr. James D. Clements at 93, 98, Olson.
146. See Taylor, supra note 50, at 6-7. The restraints used included shackles (leather and metal),
cords, rags, straight-jackets, helmets, and mitten-like coverings. Id. Rather than deterring behavior,
the method of restraint encouraged misbehavior. See Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Travis I.
Thompson at 22, Olson. Moreover, "time out" rooms were potentially harmful to residents due to
small size, protruding surfaces, electrical hazards, poor ventilation, absence of observation windows,
and lack of padding for residents to lie on to relax or calm down. Id. at 21-22.
147. See Transcript of Testimony of Alfred A. Baumeister at 98, Olson. Dr. Baumeister, an
expert on mental retardation, testified that the Grafton State School should not be in the business of
providing habilitative care to persons with mental retardation as it was then operating. Id.
148. See Transcript of Testimony of Dr. HerbertJ. Grossman at 126, Olson (staff generally did
not interact with residents); see also Transcript of Testimony of Dr. James D. Clements at 82, 88, 94-
95, 97, 117-18, Olson (staff members did not relate to or involve themselves with residents).
149. See Transcript of Testimony of Dr. James D. Clements at 118, Olson.
150. Id. at 103 (residents learned abusive behavior by observing other residents' abusive
behavior, i.e., headbanging and the "popping out" of an eye).
151. Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Leonard T. Fielding at 10, Olson. One resident's
prescription for Dilantin, a drug used to control a seizure disorder, was reduced without obtaining an
electroencephalogram to determine any change in seizure activity. Id. at 11-12. Another resident
never received the skull film and thyroid study that were recommended when staff members
observed symptoms of hyperthyroidism. Id. at 13. Yet another inconsistency between medical care
and a resident's survival needs arose with a manic resident. The resident was given phenythyazines
to control his behavior problems. Id. at 14. However, no lab follow up was performed to determined
whether the patient was manifesting any of the harmful side effects of the drug. Id.
152. See Transcript of Testimony of Karen Green at 99-116, Olson (discussing many examples of
improper use of equipment, mishandling, and improper positioning of patients). Karen Green, a
registered nurse, testified regarding the adaptive equipment at San Haven and Grafton. She stated:
"[The residents] would be better offwithout it. It would be better for those clients to spend their time
flat on their backs in bed than to be on those devices because they are so deformity producing." Id. at
99-100.
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people there, but at the place. I know that people who are
retarded, even though they are severely or profoundly
retarded, don't have to look the way they did and they
certainly don't have to act the way they did. Grafton and
San Haven to me represent the wrong concept at the
wrong time and inthe wrong place. My impression is that
the impact on the lives of the residents who live there is
utterly devastating. They are places where the emphasis
is to survive rather than to thrive. 153
Considering the obvious inadequacies at Grafton and San
Haven, the State could offer precious little as a defense to the
egregious facts introduced by the plaintiffs. The State's primary
defense was that it had initiated a plan to correct the deficiencies. 1 54
The State's defense was hindered by testimony that provided
an objective statistical evaluation of the quality of care provided to
persons with mental retardation in North Dakota. For example, in
1971, North Dakota was ranked forty-ninth out of the fifty states
with regard to the quality of care provided to persons with mental
* retardation. 15  Indicative of the lack of community based
alternatives, North Dakota institutionalized more persons per
capita than any state in the nation. 56 At the same time, North
Dakota spent substantially less money, per capita, than any other
state on institutionalized individuals. 157
Against this background, the district court issued its landmark
order on August 31, 1983. The order is legally noteworthy since it
153. Transcript of Testimony of Dr. James D. Clements at 22-23, Olson. The premiere expert
witness for the defense agreed that the Grafton State School represented "the wrong concept in the
wrong place at the wrong time." Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Herbert J. Grossman at 139-40,
Olson.
154. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES DIVISION, NORTH DAKOTA STATE COUNCIL ON
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, AMENDED NORTH .DAKOTA STATE PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES SERVICES (1981-83).
155. See Transcript of Testimony of Earl C. Butterfield at 59-60, Olson. The comparison of
quality of care between North Dakota and other states was based on three factors: (1) the number of
dollars spent per day for each mentally retarded resident in state facilities; (2) the number of
institutionalized mentally retarded persons compared to the state's total population; and (3) the
percentage of the state's total population that were new admissions into institutions for the mentally
retarded. See id. at 55. Using these standards, by 1980, North Dakota ranked 50th out of the 50 states
in the quality of care provided persons with mental retardation. Id. at 62 ("North Dakota had one
step to go, down, from '71, and between now and then, it has taken that step").
156. See G. Krantz, J. Clumpner, L. Rotegard & R. Bruininks, Mentally Retarded People in
State-Operated Residential Facilities: Year Ending June 30, 1980, 43 (2d ed. Aug. 1982)
(institutionalization rates for each state) (available at Department of Psychoeducational Studies,
University of Minnesota). The national average per capita rate of institutionalization was 58 people
out of every 100,000. Id. North Dakota, however, was institutionalizing 164 people out of every
100,000. Id.
157. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd,
713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[iln 1981, as ofJune 30, the average national per diem expenditure
was $77.99 per resident, compared to North Dakota's per diem of $26.42").
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was the first major class action suit regarding the right to
habilitation in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in
Youngberg v. Romeo. 158 Before addressing the impact of Youngberg,
however, the district court outlined the extent of the constitutional
obligation imposed upon the defendants. 15 9 The court stated that
"if North Dakota chooses to operate facilities for the mentally
retarded, the operation of these facilities must meet minimal
constitutional standards, and the obligation to meet those standards
may not yield to financial considerations." 160
The court then proceeded to consider the implications of the
Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo. 161 The minimal
constitutional standards specifically required pursuant to Youngberg
were based on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.1 62 The district court interpreted these constitutional
guarantees to include:
1. A right to adequate food, shelter, clothing and
medical care;
2. A right to reasonably safe conditions;
3. A right to freedom from restraint, except insofar as
professional judgments determine such restraints
necessary to assure a resident's safety or to provide
needed training; and,
4. A right to such training as professional judgment
determines is reasonable to ensure a resident's safety
and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily
restraints. 163
The district court considered each of these rights in light of the facts
of the present case. 164 The court began by stating the obligations
158. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes 77-90 and accompanying
text.
159. See Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 484.
160. Id.
161. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes
77-90 and accompanying text.
162. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314 & n.16; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S I (due process clause).
In addition to the rights derived from the due process clause, the district court in Olson also found the
plaintiffs were entitled to four other rights. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 491-94. First, the court stated that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the rights of privacy, property and free association under the first
amendment. Id. at 491-92; see U.S. CONST. amend. I. Second, the court stated that the plaintiffs had
a right to education under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. Olson, 561 F. Supp.
492-93; see The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401-1420 (1978
& Supp. 1986). Third, the plaintiffs had a right to equal protection under The Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 493; see The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985).
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had certain rights regarding treatment and
habilitation under chapter 25-01.2 of the North Dakota Century Code. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 493-
94; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-01.2 (Supp. 1985).
163. Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 486.
164. Id.; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra
notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
that these rights imposed on the state. 165 The first right required the
state to address "the over-crowding in the Grafton State School,
the misuse of medication, the shortage of staff to perform necessary
functions, and the unavailability of adequate dental care.' '1 66 The
second right required the state to evaluate fire procedures, the
adequacy of supervision in dangerous situations, and hazardous
conditions that existed in Grafton and San Haven such as slippery
floors, crowding in the tunnels, harmful noise levels, and the
residents' safety from attack by others. 167
The third right imposed a standard for the proper use of
physical and chemical restraint, and for the deprivation of other
liberty interests, such as the right to travel and the right to make
personal choices.' 68 Furthermore, the district court concluded that
the third right required the state, under certain conditions, to
provide treatment in the least restrictive setting. 169 The court stated
that "a constitutional right to the least restrictive method of care or
treatment exists only insofar as professional judgment determines
that such alternatives would measurably enhance the resident's
enjoyment of basic liberty interests."170
The final right required the state to provide training when
training is necessary to enhance or further the resident's enjoyment
of his or her basic liberty rights. 171 However, the court specifically
rejected the broadest right to habilitation, which would have
required the state to provide training that would enhance the skills
necessary to cure or improve a resident's condition.1 72 If, however,
the acquisition of the skills is necessary to allow for the enjoyment
of basic liberty rights, then habilitation is required. 73
The district court made extensive findings concerning the
defendants' failure to meet its legal obligations.174 First, the district
165. See Olson, 561 F. Supp. at 486.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court concluded that the Youngberg decision indicates that the United States
Supreme Court would reject an absolute right to treatment in the least restrictive environment. Id.;
see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a discussion of Youngberg, see supra notes 77-90
and accompanying text.
171. 561 F. Supp. at 486-87.
172. Id. at 487. The court rejected the broad habilitative right because the United States
Supreme Court, in Youngberg, held that a resident has a right to training only when that training will
further the patient's liberty interests. Id. at 486-87; see Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 31§ & n.25.
173. See 561 F. Supp. at 486-87. The court adopted the definition of treatment that was
enunciated by Justice Blackmun in Youngberg v. Romeo. Id. at 487; see Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
327 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to the district court, Justice Blackmun's definition of
treatment includes training that ensures independence to participate in new activities and the
acquisition and maintenance of skills that are necessary to exercise basic liberties. See 561 F. Supp. at
487.
174. See 561 F. Supp. at 482.
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court referred to the current "negative institutional
characteristics" that existed at Grafton and San Haven.1 75
Negative institutional characteristics are those inherent
characteristics of an institution that adversely affect the treatment
and habilitation of persons with mental retardation and related
disabilities. 176 The court stated that Grafton and San Haven
exhibited the following negative institutional characteristics:
a. Non-communication and non-association between the
resident and the care personnel.
b. A pattern of treatment of the resident as an infant or a
non-person.
c. An absence of privacy for the resident.
d. A deprivation of the right of self-determination in
little things, for example, what to wear, what to eat,
and [what] to do as recreation, and who to talk to.
e. Unimaginative and drab meals.
f. Use of clothing in common, like room arrangements,
like furniture, like ornamentation.
g. Isolation from contacts and experiences outside the
residence. 1 77
The court concluded that the negative institutional characteristics
were "harmful in themselves, and have caused regression among
the residents.' '178
The district court also found deficiencies in the development of
habilitation plans, the administration of drugs, and the feeding of
residents. 179 The effects of these deficiencies on residents were also
175. See id.
176. See id. Although negative institutional characteristics are predominantly found in
institutions, the court concluded that these characteristics can and do arise in community and foster
homes that house persons with mental retardation. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 481. The court attributed the regression in the residents' ability to communicate,
walk, and feed themselves to negative institutional characteristics. See id.
179. Id. at 479. The court stated that the inidividualized habilitation plans were deficient in the
following respects:
a. The plans are not reflective of the existent state of the science of habilitation; and
b. There is no provision for independent evaluation of the plans; and
c. There are not adequate records to assist the professional staff to develop the plans;
and
d. There is not sufficient staff to develop and keep an adequate review of the plans;
and
e. There is not sufficient staff to execute, keep records on, and follow the plans; and
f. There are not sufficient facilities to allow for the execution of the plans, for
example, classrooms, support equipment, direct care staff, and supplies.
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noted by the court: residents were crowded into large, open noisy
wards; residents lay inactive, except for limited bed care furnished
by a few direct care staff who devoted much of their time to
janitorial, housekeeping, and record keeping tasks; wards for
violent or dangerous residents were quite crowded, excessively
noisy, and badly understaffed; residents manifested behaviors that
evidenced boredom - rocking back and forth, picking, self-hitting,
plucking at ears, eyes, and nose, and beating hands or head against
obstacles; and there was a high incidence of abuse between
residents, and occasional abuse between a member of the staff and
a resident.' 80
Based upon these violations of the class members' rights, the
district court issued an order granting comprehensive injunctive
relief. 181 The terms of the order included a massive expansion of the
community based system and a reduction in the institutional
population.1 8 2 This order was supplemented by a sixty-one page
implementation order, which was issued on March 7, 1984.183 The
implementation order provides a detailed explanation of the class
members' rights and the defendants' obligation. Any practitioner
seeking programs and services for developmentally disabled
persons in North Dakota, or examining the rights of
developmentally disabled persons in North Dakota, should begin
with an examination of the district court's implementation order.
The following subsections provide a detailed explanation of this
order.
C. DEFINITION OF A CLASS MEMBER ENTITLED TO RIGHTS
The implementation order refers to class members,1 4
residents,18 5 and clients. 186 Residents are defined as those persons
Id. Deficiencies in the administration of drugs were exemplified by instances of drugs delivered to the
wrong residents, drugs left unguarded among the residents, and the failure to maintain a meaningful
record of drug usage. Id.
180. Id. at 480-81.
181. Id. at 494-95.
182. Id.
183. Implementation Order, Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473
(D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
184. Id. at 7. The term "class members" refers to those "persons who, as of September 26,
1980, and at any time subsequent, have been or may become residents of Grafton State School,
located near Grafton, North Dakota, and San Haven, located near Dunseith, North Dakota." Id.
185. Id. at 9. The implementation order defined residents as follows: "The term 'resident' refers
to any developmentally disabled person now or in the future confined to Grafton, either on a
temporary or long-term basis." Id.
186. Id. at 3. The implementation order defined clients as follows: "The term 'clients' refers to
all developmentally disabled persons who are recipients of community programming services and
who are in or have applied for placement in community facilities or alternative living
arrangements." Id.
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who reside at the Grafton State School and San Haven. 187
Noninstitutionalized class members and clients are not as easily
identified. The order, however, provides a presumption that any
developmentally disabled188 individual who is in need of services or
residential facilities, or who is receiving inadequate or
inappropriate services, residential placements, care, or treatment is
a class member. 8 9
The term "developmental disability" is not synonymous with
mental retardation. Included within the population defined as
"developmentally disabled" are individuals who may be mentally
retarded, chronically mentally ill, or physically impaired.190
Recently, however, the district court has ruled that persons who
suffer exclusively from mental illness, without concomitant mental
retardation or related disabilities, are not class members. 191 The
scope of disabilities related to mental retardation has not yet been
determined.
187. See id. at 9. For the court's definition of residents, see supra note 185.
188. "Developmental disability" is defined in the order as:
[A] severe, chronic disability of a person which:
(a) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combinationn of mental
and physical impairments;
(b) is manifested before the person attains the age of twenty-two (22);
(c) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(d) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following
areas of major life activity:
(1) self care;
(2) receptive and expressive language;
(3) learning;
(4) mobility;
(5) self direction;
(6) capacity for independent living;
(7) economic self-sufficiency; and
(e) reflects a person's need for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment or other services which are
individually planned and coordinated.
Id. at 3-4. For the text of the North Dakota Century Code's definition of developmental disability,
which is nearly identical to the court's definition, see supra note 1.
189. Id. at 38. Developmentally disabled persons who meet the designated criteria are presumed
to be class members unkss a contrary decision is made by a monitor. Id.
190. E. Gollay, The Definition of a Developmental Disability: Issues and Problems for North
Dakota 7 (Jan. 16, 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
191. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Sinner, Civ. No. Al-80-141 (D.N.D. Feb. 6,
1987) (order defining class members). Although the person at issue was developmentally disabled,
the court found the person not to be within the plaintiff class because "the original definition of the
plaintiffs' class was restricted, with the assistance of plaintiffs' counsel, to exclude those persons
loosely identified as mentally ill." Id. at 8.
The court also declined to redefine the class to include the mentally ill. Id. The court's
justification was based on three premises. See id. at 8-9. First, the plaintiffs had deliberately omitted
the mentally ill in their original action. Id. Second, the current plaintiff failed to show that his
treatment was not already adequate. See id. at 9. Finally, redefinition would require the parties to
completely restructure the procedure and order determining the class. Id.
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D. WHO. IS A "DEFENDANT" OBLIGATED TO MEET THE
RIGHTS OF CLASS MEMBERS
The implementation order, by its terms, applies to the
"[d]efendants, their successors, officers, agents, servants,
employees, and all other persons in active consort with them." 192
The main defendants are the Governor of the State of North
Dakota, the Director of Institutions, the Department of Human
Services, the Department of Vocational Education, and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, including the Division of
Special Education. 193
E. THE.RIGHTS TO WHICH CLASS MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED
UNDER THE.ORDER
The implementation order is a sixty-one page document that
provides a variety of procedural and substantive rights for all class
members. The most basic right acknowledged in the order is the
right to treatment and habilitation. 194 The right to treatment and
habilitation encompasses every domain of the class members'
needs, including education, recreation, dental services, medical
services, physical and occupational therapy services, and
communication services. 195
Implicit in the right to treatment and habilitation are
individualized programs and services. The order recognizes this
concept by requiring that each member shall have an
individualized habilitation plan.1 96 The plan must be based on
appropriate and reliable professional assessments, and formulated
under recognized standards. 97  Moreover, the individualized
192. Implementation Order at 1, Olson.
193. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1384 (8th Cir. 1983) (listing
the individual defendants).
194. See Implementation Order at 10, Olson. The court order provides:
Defendants must provide members of the plaintiff class with an individualized
program of treatment and habilitation that affords each member a reasonable chance
a) to acquire and maintain those life skills that will enable each member to cope with
the demands of person and environment as effectively as the class member's capacities
permit, and b) to raise the level of each class member's physical, mental and social
functioning. The right to habilitation and treatment is possessed by every class
member, regardless of age, degree of retardation or handicapping condition.
Id.
195. See id. at 16-20.
196. Id. at 11.
197. Id.; see Accreditation Council for Services for Mentally Retarded and Other
Developmentally Disabled Persons, Standards for Services for Developmentally Disabled Individuals (1981)
(recognized by the court as the standard for determining the individual habilitation plan).
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habilitation plan must be developed by an individual habilitation
plan team. 198 An individual habilitation team is comprised of a
group of professionals representing the professions, disciplines, and
service areas relevant to identifying a class member's needs. 99 The
team is responsible for designing programs to meet these needs. 200
A final component of the right to treatment and habilitation
mandated by the order is the requirement that the defendants
provide sufficient numbers of trained and qualified staff to provide
the services required under the order. 20 1 The order requires that the
Grafton State School, by July 1, 1985, employ sufficient staff to
maintain a staff to resident ratio of 1 to 4 during waking hours and
1 to 8 at night.20 2 The order also requires the Grafton State School
to maintain a ratio between medical doctors, nurses, or physician
assistants and residents of 1 to 100.203 Moreover, the order requires
that at least one doctoral level psychologist be available to the
residents of the Grafton State School. 204
The order also recognizes two concepts essential to the
developmental model of treatment: the least restrictive
alternative205 and normalization. 20 6 The concept of the least
restrictive alternative is implict in the order's requirement that the
state expeditiously develop additional community placement
facilities to provide for all individuals capable of residing in these
minimally restrictive settings. 207  The order recognizes
normalization by requiring the defendants to provide environments
that represent the "most normal living condition possible.' '208
The implementation order acknowledges a variety of other
rights for class members, 20 9 including the right to be free from
198. Implementation Order at 11-12, Olson.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 23-25, 47-48.
202. Id. at 23.
203. Id. at 24.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 10. The implementation order defines "least restrictive alternative" as "that
intervention into the life of a developmentally disabled individual that is the least intrusive into, and
the least disruptive of, the individual's life; such intervention also represents the least departure from
the normal pattern of living that can be effective in meeting the individual's developmental needs."
Id. at 7. If the least restrictive alternative is a community placement and one is unavailable, the order
requires the expeditious development of additional community placement facilities to provide for all
individuals capable of residing in them. Id. at 41.
206. Id. at 10-11. The order requires the defendants to provide class members with
environments that represent the "most normal living condition possible." Id. at 10.
207. Seeid. at41.
208. Id. at 10.
209. Id. at 21-22. Additional rights enumerated by the order include the right to be free from
performing labor without compensation; the right to freely exercise choice of religion; the right to
private communication by mail, telephone, and visitation; the right to receive, possess, and use
personal property; the right to vote; and the right to keep personal records confidential. See id.
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harm210 and the right to an advocate. 211 The implementation order
prohibits physical abuse of class members in any form and provides
specific limitations and guidelines governing the use of physical or
chemical restraints, including behavior modification medication.2 12
,Use of behavior modification medication is justified only after
specific factors are considered by the attending physician. 21 3 The
attending physician has the primary duty to insure that the class
member's progress and response to the treatment, including
adverse effects, are carefully monitored and recorded. 214
Paragraph 136 of the order requires the defendants to establish
a state advocacy program sufficient to serve all class members. 21 5
The purpose of the program is to provide representation for class
members so that they may realize the rights to which they are
entitled. 21 6 The net effect of this provision is that North Dakota
now has a unique proactive advocacy system designed to represent
all class members. Presumably, this proactive system was needed
because the district court concluded that a passive advocacy
system, which requires class members to file complaints with the
advocacy program to receive representation, did not adequately
protect the rights of the state's developmentally disabled
individuals.217
210. Id. at 12.
211. Id. at 57-58. The term "advocate" refers to a person available to class members to
represent their rights and interests, obtain needed services, and assist in overcoming any existing
barriers between the class member and his or her needs. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 12-16. The germane limitation placed upon physical restraints is that such restraints
may only be used as "a necessary complement to positive programming designed to strengthen
desirable and adaptive behavior." Id. at 12-13. Chemical restraints may be used only upon a
doctor's written order. Id. at 13-14. Furthermore, issued orders are effective for a maximum of
ninety days. Id. at 14. Moreover, use of medication must be noted in each resident's medical records.
Id. Finally, medication that is used for behavior modification must be used as part of an individual's
habilitation plan designed to eliminate inappropriate behavior. Id.
213. Id. Before psychotropic medication is prescribed or renewed, the doctor shall consider: (1)
the behavior to be modified and its frequency; (2) the documentation of progress and side effects; and
(3) the rationale for choosing a particular medication. Id. at 14-15.
214. Id. at 15. The order requires that the attending physician shall:
(1) ensure that persons responsible for the resident's habilitation, education, care and
other treatment are informed as to the significant potential effects of the
medication and record their observations on the effects of the medication,
including effects on the resident's progress in habilitation and education programs,
as well as participation in other activities; and
(2) ensure that appropriate laboratory tests are performed and properly analyzed.
Id.
215. Id. at 57. Pursuant to the order, the advocacy program was to be operational by July 1,
1984. Id.
216. Id. The order states that the advocacy program shall ensure that class members receive
needed services, investigate complaints of abuse and neglect, and remove any barriers to identify the
needs of class members. See id.
217. See id. (ordering development of advocacy program in addition to allowing class members
to select a volunteer advocate).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The implementation order also requires massive systematic
modification in the services provided to the developmentally
disabled not residing at the Grafton State School. 218 The order
requires the defendants to expand and maintain a statewide service
delivery system. 21 9 These services are to be developed at a rate
consistent with the rate of deinstitutionalization of residents at the
Grafton State School and San Haven. 220 The expansion of the
community based system is designed to facilitate the
deinstitutionalization of the Grafton and San Haven residents and
to accommodate the needs of noninstitutionalized class
members. 221 Class members who are not residing at Grafton or San
Haven may obtain community services, including residential
placements or day programs, by making a request to the regional
developmental disabilities director, coordinator, or staff.222
Moreover, after July 1, 1987, the defendants are required to
maintain the level of newly created services and, if needed, to
create additional services, facilities, and alternative living
arrangements to meet the needs of class members. 223 As a
safeguard, residents of the Grafton State School may not be moved
to community programs until all identified services are in place. 224
V. CONCLUSION
Although misconceptions concerning disabled persons remain,
many of the misconceptions have been eroded in recent years. One
reason for the erosion of the destructive stereotypes is the
recognition by most professionals that persons with mental
retardation and related disabilities are capable of learning and
development regardless of the severity of their handicap. This
218. See id. at 38. The court stated that "[alfterJuly 1, 1987, the defendants shall maintain the
level of newly created placements and services and, if needed, create further services, facilities, and
alternative living arrangements, to assure that needs of class members are met." Id. at 38-39.
219. Id. at 38. The order requires services for the diagnosis, evaluation, and habilitation of class
members. Id. These services include "institutional services, family care . .. , foster care, day care,
respite care, crisis intervention, community residences, development centers, and work activity
centers." Id.
220. Cf. id. at 32. The court order stated that Grafton shall not have more than 450 residents by
July 1, 1987. Id. To accomplish this reduction, the court order insured that all the programs
necessary for deinstitutionalization were implemented by that time. See, e.g., id. at 25-26 (respite care
provided within 90 days of the date of the order); id. at 43-44 (propose licensing standards for group
homes within 30 days of order); id. at 11 (individual habilitation plans by July 1984); id. at 23
(sufficient direct care staff byJuly 1985).
221. The order requires that the number of residents at the Grafton State School be reduced to
450 by.July 1, 1987 and to 250 by.July 1, 1989. Id. at 32-33.
222. Id. at 38. The parents of a class member, the class member, or other interested persons
may make the request for services. Id.
223. Id. at 38-39.
224. Id. at 34.
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recognition is reinforced by legal decisions that recognize basic
human and constitutional rights for handicapped persons. This
interface between science and law is directly responsible for
improving the lives of thousands of disabled citizens.
The interface that occurred in Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Olson represents a monumental step forward for the State of North
Dakota. Developmentally disabled citizens, whose abilities and
human resources were previously ignored* or wasted, will have the
opportunity to lead more normal and productive lives. No benefit,
financial or otherwise, is gained in wasting the vast resources
possessed by developmentally disabled citizens.
The long term cost incurred by the State of North Dakota for
providing care to class members will decrease i.s less expensive
community programs are utilized to their fullest extent. Jobs and
other economic benefits provided by treatment facilities will be
spread across the state, rather than concentrated at one institution.
Thus, the State of North Dakota will receive an intangible benefit
in eliminating the discrimination inherent in the unnecessary
segregation of persons with mental retardation and related
disabilities.
Since the interface between science and law in the context of a
right to treatment for persons with mental retardation and related
disabilities was first recognized in 1976, scientific knowledge and
legal perspectives have continued to evolve. As Association for
Retarded Citizens v. Olson demonstrates, the legal system can be
effectively utilized to assist professionals in meeting the needs and
rights of the clients they serve. As both professions continue to
evolve, the challenges will continue to demand a joint effort in
meeting the rights of disabled persons.
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